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Abstract: Attempts to determine what constitutes “good” corporate governance have become 
mired in the quicksand of the ethical conflict between duty and utility, virtue and rights, as 
well as the fight over for whose good the organization exists. This paper takes a different 
tack. Drawing upon evidence from the efforts to build and develop the UK code of corporate 
governance, it argues that the nature of “good” is intractable, but that in the practical world a 
philosophically pragmatic approach applies, exemplified in the preference for a comply or 
explain approach rather than more formal modes of regulation. Using Toulmin’s (2001) 
advocacy the reasonable, in opposition to the rational, and evidence about the principle of 
“comply or explain”, it argues that in codifying corporate governance, the UK has in effect 
opted for “reasonably” good governance, rather than best practice. In so doing, the code 
reflects concerns embodied in competing views of contributors about the contingent nature 
of organizational life and strategies and the uncertain benefits of corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
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Once upon a time … 
The story of corporate governance is often told as a fable of good and evil: the good 
journalists at Mirror Group Newspapers and the evil Robert Maxwell who stole their 
pensions to prop up his failing business empire, the good shareholders of Enron defrauded 
by the omnipotent and “unfettered” CEO, or the poor fisherman in the Gulf of Mexico 
deprived of their livelihoods by the greedy oilmen (and a few oil women) at BP, Halliburton 
and the rest. For many boards of directors, much of the time, the story is a more mundane 
one: forms to fill in, boxes to tick, time wasted in compliance that might be better spent 
strategizing or negotiating access to valuable and scarce resources. Has the striving for good 
corporate governance given itself a bad name?  
Evidence of the bad name is often more anecdotal, more evident in unguarded remarks 
than verifiable data, for corporate governance is a good that people find difficult to deny. But 
in private conversations, corporate directors complain:  
A non-executive director of one of the world’s largest corporations, who 
chairs its remuneration committee, meets an old acquaintance from earlier 
in their business careers. “What are you doing now?” the non-exec asks. 
“I’m working in corporate governance,” his former colleague replies. “If I 
had my gun now I would shoot,” the non-exec says and walks away.  
Or of the chairman of a major financial services firm who meets a 
complete stranger at a social event, someone who also expresses an interest 
in corporate governance. Few publications would print the sentence that 
followed – both for its diction and lest the slander it voiced became libel.  
These tales suggest that these directors take corporate governance very seriously. They 
care about their companies and resent the intrusions by what they see as do-gooding 
outsiders trying to impose ways of thinking and standards of action on others, when those 
others are responsible, in a legal sense, for the decisions to be made.  
Yet directors like these are also responsible, in a moral sense, for cases of malfeasance at 
all too many corporations. Their excesses, over several decades, have fostered a movement 
to identify good or even best practice in corporate governance, reinforced by mechanisms, 
    
structures and procedures, whether in the form of rules or principles. Scholars have 
attempted to discover a formula for good board performance by assessing the correlation of 
one or several mechanisms of governance, with one or another measure of performance. 
Such efforts seem to yield ambiguous results, even if we could agree that the measures 
selected were the ones that somehow mattered.  
This paper takes a different approach. It argues that good governance is historically 
situated (Bird, 2009) and contingent upon factors that cannot be controlled, that is, factors 
the directors cannot reasonably control, however rational their thought processes are. This 
argument recalls – and in its detail is based upon – the distinction in Toulmin (2001) 
between what is reasonable and what is rational. It is analogous to but not the same as the 
bounded rationality in the work of Simon (1955, 1959, 1978). Toulmin argues that 
ontological as well as epistemological limits to certainty make the rational, as we have come 
to understand it in modern thought, impossible. The limits of human intelligence alone do 
not create the problem, but rather the complexity of the problem itself.  
If the problems of governing a corporation or other types of organizations are inherently 
and intractably complex, then the lessons of cybernetics suggest that efforts to control them 
– to construct mechanisms of governance – must falter when they encounter the law of 
requisite variety (Ashby, 1958, 1968/2011). The most regulation can reasonably expect of 
directors and boards is that they are reasonable, recognize the contingency of their situation, 
and be – in the philosophic sense – pragmatic in their decisions (cf. Rorty, 1989). That 
involves trading off one set of norms for another, when the one no longer seems to suit the 
circumstances and the other holds out hope of something better.  
Let us first consider the thinking of Toulmin (1992, 2001, 2003) on rationality, 
reasonableness and the nature of argument. We will then explore the landscape of corporate 
governance, paying particular attention to the UK, where the code of conduct promulgated in 
    
1992 became a model for much of the world (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Within the 
UK, elements of its prescriptions have been embedded in recommendations for a wide 
variety of non-corporate entities, including mutual organizations (Myners, 2014), charities 
(Governance Code Steering Group, 2010) and the public sector (Nordberg, 2014).  
We will look at the conflicting aims and logics that actors bring to the argumentation. 
Next we examine briefly attempts to identify formal characteristics of good governance 
before seeking evidence of contingent approaches. The paper then considers how 
contingency is embodied in the principle called “comply or explain”, as developed in UK 
corporate governance. Through doing so, the paper will demonstrate how corporate 
governance, in the UK and then elsewhere, came to institutionalize a logic grounded in 
Toulmin’s type of reason. If we accept this type of argument, then we can see reason for the 
disagreements evident in both the debate over the code and the way scholars attempt to 
theorize what constitutes good governance. 
Reason, rationality and contingency 
In the wake of near-meltdown of the financial system in 2008, various commentators 
blamed the crisis in corporate governance on excessive faith among bank directors in the 
rationality of efficient markets and in managers to account for risk. Evidence of this is in the 
popularity of the Black Swan concept of Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), which seemed in 
hindsight to have predicted the turmoil.  
The notion of market efficiency developed in the 1950s assumed that rational investors 
would, through the wisdom of markets, find the right price for assets, provided all relevant 
information was freely and widely available (Fama, 1970). At the same time, however, 
doubts about rationality were emerging elsewhere in the literatures of economics and 
epistemology. Herbert Simon wrote of rationality as being bounded by our ability to 
    
compute the values at stake (Simon, 1955, 1959); his insights led to a new field of 
behavioural economics.  
This period, too, saw doubts about rationality emerge in a rather different setting. The 
philosopher Stephen Toulmin published the book The Uses of Argument in 1958 
(republished 2003). In it he drew the distinction between the formal argument familiar in the 
abstract world of mathematics and what he called the substantive argumentation that 
constitutes discussion in the practical world of ordinary life. 
Substantive argumentation involves a claim, supported by grounds, which are then 
linked by a warrant, the justification that leads us to accept the claim. This approach makes 
sense when the warrant itself is clear: Ground: X was born in New York; Claim: X is a US 
citizen; Warrant: The US grants citizenship to all people born on US soil. Here, the warrant 
can arguably be accepted at face value; its logic does not vary by specific circumstances. 
Such warrants are sometimes left unspoken, understood by those concerned. But warrants 
are also historically situated and may need to be qualified: Before a certain date, people born 
on US soil might lose US nationality, for example by taking the nationality of their non-US 
parents. Moreover, the more complex the field, the less likely that a claim and its associated 
warrant would be what Toulmin calls “field-invariant”. With “field-dependent” ones, 
qualifications and counter-claims are possible, creating ambiguity in argumentation.  
The importance of field-dependent variables is not just that they limit the ability of 
people to determine what is rational. They make the arguments contingent on circumstances, 
preventing actors from coming to a single rationality. This argument was controversial at the 
time, running counter to mainstream analytic philosophy. But it resonated with many other 
thinkers, contributing to the sense of an inherent non-rationality arising in physics since 
Einstein and Heisenberg, and evident in the sociology that came to be called post-
modernism.  
    
In Cosmopolis, Toulmin (1992) traced excessive faith in rationality in the modern era to 
Descartes and the resulting narrow conception of scientific inquiry that followed in the 
tradition he helped to establish. Returning to these themes in Return to Reason (2001), he 
argued that the best we could expect in an uncertain and contingent world was that people 
acted reasonably. It resonates with the contingency associated with the pragmatists Thomas 
Dewey and William James and is central to the work of Richard Rorty (1989). 
Reasonableness is an important concept in law and business. Juries are asked to find 
evidence of guilt “beyond reasonable doubt”. Directors – of corporations based in Delaware 
and other jurisdictions that have accepted its prevailing logic – might call it “business 
judgement”, the rule that prevents shareholders for using hindsight to sue board members 
when a decision goes wrong (cf. Pearlstein, 2014; Sharfman, 2012).  
Among management theorists, Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011) invoke Toulmin’s doubts 
about the rational in arguing for what they term “practical” rather than “scientific” 
rationality. The idea of reasonableness has attracted attention in a number of fields, though 
often without specific use of Toulmin. Scholars in Finland studied perceptions of 
reasonableness and unreasonableness in a business network, linking them to trust and 
mistrust (Kohtamäki, Vesalainen, Varamäki, & Vuorinen, 2006). Li and colleagues (2012) 
measured reasonableness as perceived by Chinese non-executive directors, associating it 
with expectations of director performance. Lydenberg (2014) advocates reasonableness over 
rationality in considering the fiduciary duties of investors. In healthcare, some studies tie 
reasonableness to a Rawlsian sense of justice (Daniels & Sabin, 1997; Reeleder, Goel, 
Singer, & Martin, 2008).  
Philosophers have long separated the reasonable from the rational. Rawls (2005, p. 48n)1 
traces it to Kant’s distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperative in his 
Groundwork (1785/1964). Sibley (1953) distinguished between the rational and the 
    
reasonable on the grounds that rational behaviour involved reflective consideration of one 
interests, while reasonable behaviour, at least in its moral sense, involve some element of 
objectivity. Philosophers have debated whether this distinction can be supported. For 
example, Gewirth (1983) argues that the reasonable is included within the rational, though 
superior to the self-referencing version of rationality in Sibley’s formulation. These notions 
informed Rawls’s argument about how we achieve political stability in liberal democracies. 
In his view, being reasonable is part of a political ideal, rather than an epistemological idea. 
It “includes what free an equal citizens as reasonable can require of each other” (Rawls, 
2005, p. 62). Linked to his theory of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1958, 1999), the reasonable 
involves, in effect, a willing suspension of belief in comprehensive doctrines, making 
possible the creation of liberal institutions. While Rawls argues that reasonableness involves 
acceptance of the limitations of doctrine, Sen (2009) contends Rawls’s political ideal, like 
his invocation of the “original position”, nonetheless involves a transcendental stance. Sen 
questions whether it is possible “to identify ‘just’ institutions for a society without making 
them contingent upon actual behaviour” whether or not that behaviour is just or reasonable 
(Sen, 2009, p. 68). 
Reasonableness, in Toulmin’s terms, avoids ideals and the transcendental. He calls 
reasonableness “the possibility of living, as in pre-modern times, without any absolute 
necessities or certainties” (2001, p. 1). Rationality, associated with positivism and certainty, 
falters at the hurdle of describing what happens in practice. Since Toulmin’s early work, the 
analytic philosophy of the 1930s to 1950s has been in retreat and moral problems (he uses 
the example of medical practice) “are being handled less by strictly theoretical analysis than 
on a ‘case-by-case’ basis” (Toulmin, 2001, p. 167). In the face of complexity, of the sort of 
complexity that defies calculation, multiple answers may apply to the same situation, and 
what’s best is impossible to determine.  
    
Toulmin suggests the appeal of the rational arose from its formal, mathematical proof, 
which became compelling because its abstractness conveyed universality. The power of the 
proof lies in its formality, that is, its separation from the messiness of the world. Coping with 
that world, however, requires something else, what he calls “substantive arguments”. They 
involve three distinctions from formal inquiries: first, that evidence from the real world is 
historical and therefore becomes dated; second, that rival interpretations of such data are 
possible; and third, that the concepts involved in interpretation can be ambiguous (Toulmin, 
2001, pp. 20-21). The best substantive arguments can claim to do “is to put a conclusion 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and establish the ‘strongest possible presumption’” (Toulmin, 
2001, p. 19). These expressions are familiar in criminal law as well as the philosophical 
discussion that followed his Uses of Argument in the 1950s. This is not a relativist approach 
to determining the right thing to do. It is, rather, an argument based on contingency: In these 
circumstances, at this time, it is what reasonable people can agree.  
These ideas resonate with the themes of corporate governance, as we shall see. For 
corporate governance itself lacks clear definition, its concepts are ambiguous, and actors 
from various disciplines take very different stances not only as to what is the right answer 
but even as to what is the right question. 
Corporate governance as a landscape 
Corporate governance scholars sometimes describe their subject as a field, but it isn’t, 
not in a conventional way. Even as metaphor, fields have boundaries – limits where they 
abut other fields or paths – with dividing lines that define their shape and delineate 
ownership, even if those boundaries are sometimes fuzzy and open to dispute. In sociology, 
fields have members who share a common language, making communication possible, and 
common understandings, making communication sometimes unnecessary. That is, they have 
norms, rules of the game, creating institutional ar
    
& Ocasio, 2008) that members understand even when they might not articulate them (Green, 
2004). Institutional logics are, therefore, less like the formal logic in mathematics and more 
like the substantive argumentation in Toulmin (2003). They may invoke warrants to support 
their claims. But as they become institutionalized, the warrant is often unspoken, taken for 
granted by those to adhere to the institution.  
A field that isn’t 
Corporations share a broadly common form and a logic of supplying goods and services 
to customers for a profit. The field they inhabit overlaps with the field of institutional 
investors (some of which are themselves corporations), but the investors’ field involves the 
primacy of investor interests: the corporation exists to produce returns for investors – capital 
gains and dividends, not products and services. Logics of investment markets guide and 
direct the interaction between investors and investee companies. Their advisers inhabit other 
fields, the professions of law and accountancy prominent among them.  
These fields arise in different broad social domains, what Puxty and colleagues (1987) 
call organizing principles, or what Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton (2004) call 
institutional orders, where deeply held beliefs are rooted. Principal among them are the 
belief in the efficiency of markets, the knowledge of the profession, or the natural justice of 
families; the immanent power of religion, the hierarchy of the corporation, or the 
bureaucracy and sovereignty of the state.  
In corporate governance the state is an important actor, setting out the legal basis for 
corporations and the regulatory regimes they follow. But as we will see, there are reasons to 
believe it is a weakened actor, and was a particularly weak one as UK corporate governance 
became codified. Actors from other fields, arising in other orders, play a prominent role, too. 
Institutional investors populate the field of capital markets with a power that overwhelms the 
“savers” who co-habit it. Theirs is a logic of shareholder value (Lok, 2010), rooted in 
    
markets. For Thornton (2004), the prevalence of the corporate form means that corporations 
warrant an order of their own, one giving rise to a logic based on strategic choice. Advisers, 
especially those in law or accountancy, sit in fields governed by professional logics, with 
their commitment to a body of knowledge that (at least, notionally) takes precedence over 
the merely commercial. There are many other actors, less powerful, in other fields, too. 
Corporate governance looks different to different actors, depending on where they stand 
(Ahrens, Filatotchev, & Thomsen, 2011).  
In increasingly global investment markets, even the geographic boundaries of fields have 
become blurred, and as that happens questions arise about whose rules apply, which can 
throw the legitimacy of the rules themselves into doubt. Indeed, that globalization of markets 
diminished the power of the state, reducing the constraints on corporations as well as 
markets.  
Let’s call corporate governance something else, then, a landscape. The view it frames 
includes a number of fields. Some common understandings may prove, therefore, to be 
common misunderstandings, where actors use the same words to mean something different, 
and where meanings may be translated to fit with the actors’ individual meaning systems 
(Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996), leading to differing interpretations that may remain without 
articulation, because in this non-field actors still, almost, understand each other.  
An example of near understanding comes in a defining statement in the Cadbury Code. 
Sir Adrian Cadbury had been asked by the London Stock Exchange and the accounting 
profession to examine the “financial aspects” of corporate governance, after perceived 
failings in audit at several large corporations. But Cadbury went beyond that brief. In an oft-
cited paragraph, the Cadbury Commission calls corporate governance “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. The next sentence added: “Boards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of their companies” (Cadbury, 1992, Section 2.5). This 
    
seemingly uncontroversial statement was the subject of controversy during the drafting. The 
draft text published in May 1992 described corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are run” adding: “At the centre of the system is the board of directors whose 
actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in the general meeting” (CAD-
022292). In the draft, the board was not in charge, merely at the centre of a complete web of 
governance arrangements.  
Many, often hostile voices, mainly from corporations, insisted boards do not “run” 
companies – that is the job of management. And they urged that the external actors – the 
state through law and regulation, and even shareholders – be kept out of the definition (Spira 
& Slinn, 2013). The change to the text made the board preeminent and yet not in charge. 
Still, the language remained that of a “system”, with interacting components, but it left 
unstated until later which components mattered. The resulting ambiguity created scope in the 
definition itself for differing interpretations.  
The landscape framed by the Cadbury Code contained fields from institutional orders of 
the market and to a lesser extent the state. The market appeared in Cadbury’s emphasis on 
accountability to shareholders (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013) and in the disciplinary effects of 
shareholder scrutiny of compliance. Regulation was present, too, but in the hands of market-
led bodies, the UK Listing Authority, at the time the Stock Exchange’s self-regulatory arm, 
and the accountancy profession’s self-regulator, the Financial Reporting Council. Following 
a change in government in 1997, both became state-controlled bodies. But in 1992, a 
weakened and fractious government, led by the Conservative John Major, seemed unable to 
act on corporate affairs. And as the code institutionalized, the order of the corporation was 
the dominant object in view.  
    
Logics in the landscape 
 The various fields in the landscape of corporate governance each come with their own 
sets of rituals and routines, and the institutions they constitute have their own logics. In the 
institutional logics perspective (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), social action is 
governed through the interplay of logics, as institutions, often from different orders, contest 
for attention. Actors in the various fields in the corporate governance landscape bring 
different logics to the debate. Three are particularly important: first, the managerialism of 
corporations; second, shareholder primacy, with large fund management firms primus inter 
pares; and third, the expert knowledge of professional advisers. 
Corporations and their boards might be expected to be guided by logics that give 
primacy to the manager at the top of the internal hierarchy. This is a logic of managerialism 
(Lok, 2010), which in its beneficial manifestation has links to stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). But managerialism is also associated self-serving 
managers, whose neglect of shareholder interests provided the springboard for corporate 
governance reform in the US and the rise of shareholder activism in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Pearlstein, 2014).  
That change in thinking involved an assumption of shareholder primacy, in evidence in 
the recipes of agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
assumption here is that shareholders use a different logic, based in agency theory (Westphal 
& Graebner, 2010), governing interactions with companies, emphasizing the primacy of 
market principles and with shareholder legitimacy validated by property rights. Following 
the precepts of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), oversight of corporations 
involves the use of ever greater transparency and disclosure, and governance mechanisms to 
align managerial pay with shareholder returns.  
    
Professional advisers to both corporations and investment firms include lawyers and 
accountants. They gain their special place in corporate affairs and capital markets by virtue 
of specialist knowledge and their adherence to professional norms, as well as powers 
invested in them by the state through institutional arrangements arising in law. The logics of 
these professions, and their endorsement in law, presume such norms take precedence over 
commercial benefit. But the recurrent crisis in corporate governance has been traced, at least 
in part, to the failure of these professionals to give sufficient primacy to the norms (Toffler 
& Reingold, 2003). The accounting profession, for example, faced a competing logic from 
the commercial imperatives of running what had themselves become large organizations 
(Hinings, Brown, & Greenwood, 1991; Suddaby, Gendron, & Lam, 2009; Thornton, Jones, 
& Kury, 2005). 
These logics may bring different understandings to bear on the specific recipes of the 
new proto-institution that embraces all three fields. A managerial logic might value the 
service role of directors over their control function. It would tend to value the decisive power 
of a unified leader implied by embodying the chairman and CEO in one person. A market-
based, agency logic might favour a more controlling board with strong supervisory powers, 
equity incentives to motivate management, and a separation of the chairman and CEO. A 
professional logic would look for standards to be applied, albeit with discretion given on the 
basis of expertise. It might also advocate a clear evidence-base for the decision. As we shall 
see, the evidence is somewhat less than clear.  
Normative and contingent corporate governance 
The search for solutions to the problems of governance led to prescriptions of various 
kinds, some legal remedies, others through principles-based codes that become more rule-
based over time (cf. Toulmin, 1981; Weaver, 1995). Rationalist prescriptions of agency 
theory led to the use of equity-linked rewards, and in particular stock options. But then came 
    
scandals of backdating of option grants and other ruses to benefit corporate elites (Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, & Peyer, 2009). An alternative, equally rationalist approach came in mandatory 
measures, with the force of law. But attempts to legislate for good corporate governance, like 
those in the US Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, have been called examples of the law 
of unintended consequences (Fletcher & Miles, 2004; NACD, 2012; Wong, 2009). Moreover 
the development of commercial corporate governance metrics services, which once guided 
mainly voting decisions of investment managers, have morphed into rationalist metrics of 
risk management, despite ambiguous evidence of their validity (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; 
Brown & Caylor, 2006; Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010; Rose, 2007).  
By contrast, practice-led studies have tended to show that boards of directors adopt 
different approaches to corporate governance, on behavioural and structural levels, 
depending on the circumstances of the company. For example, some showed different 
emphases in board behaviour depending on life-cycle stage and firm size (Filatotchev, Toms, 
& Wright, 2006; Huse & Zattoni, 2008), suggesting value from more contingent approaches 
to structure and process.  
The governance mechanisms introduced in the Cadbury Code (1992) were more 
reasonable than rational. They sought to ensure that no one person or group had “unfettered 
power” in the boardroom, though more than 20 years later, we still lack firm evidence that its 
prescriptions, like ending CEO duality, work (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). Some 
studies find that splitting the roles of chairman and CEO is a double-edged sword 
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994); others see its value as contingent of various other factors 
(Elsayed, 2007; van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013). Arguing in Toulmin’s (2003) terms, 
the claim that good practice requires separating the roles of chairman and CEO is based on 
the grounds of the collapse of major UK corporations with all-powerful leaders, and on a 
warrant that generalizes the value of a fettered CEO. The argument it entails is reasonable. 
    
The UK code had from its outset envisaged, however, that codification of such practices 
was unlikely to solve the problems and captured that in the principle that came to be called 
“comply or explain”. After a discussion of methods, we will turn to examining how 
pressures, principally from boards of corporations, reinforced a contingent approach through 
the UK code’s approach to compliance.  
Methods 
The analysis presented here concerns the recurring debate about the nature of 
compliance in the UK codes of corporate governance. It examines contributions to the 
debates the led to the formulation of the Cadbury Code in 1992 and then the subsequent 
major revisions involved in the Combined Code of 2003 and the renamed UK Corporate 
Governance Code in 2010. These versions of the code were selected because they were 
motivated by specific crises of legitimacy, rather than being the product of a simple periodic 
review. The work involved reading all available submissions to the final consultation for 
Cadbury, the “fatal flaws only” review after publication of the Higgs Review (2003) of the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors in 2003, and all three phases of consultation in 
2009-10, which ran in parallel to the Walker Review (2009).  
In 1992, 2003 and in each phase in 2009-10, more than 100 people or organizations 
responded, with contributions ranging from one to 35 pages in length. From that a sample of 
contributions was selected, based on salience (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), for more 
detailed coding and analysis. Rhetorical devices and forceful diction were used in the textual 
analysis as signals of urgency, alongside conventional views of legitimacy and power in the 
Mitchell et al. (1997) definition. That work was then supplemented by iterative reading of 
other texts as thematic links to them emerged from analysis of the sample.  
What follows is a substantive argument, that is, an interpretation of events, though not a 
proof, concerning the origins and development of what came to be an influential concept. Its 
    
impact on UK corporate governance and the effect it has had both abroad and in non-
corporate forms of governance give the concept particular resonance. 
Explain, or just comply? 
The Cadbury Code was an institution in the making, a proto-institution (Lawrence, 
Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) seeking to legitimate certain structures 
and procedures and through codification and dissemination diffuse their prescribed practices. 
Subsequent revisions built on that base, but even before Cadbury certain aspects of corporate 
governance had an institutional character. For example, unitary boards were the norm in the 
UK, although not in law. Applying distinctions developed in DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
we can see the unitary board pre-Cadbury as the result of mimetic isomorphism, its value 
often taken for granted. Separation of the roles of chairman and CEO, one of the major 
thrusts of the Cadbury reforms, was already commonplace in the UK but far from universal. 
Post-Cadbury, it became rare, a sign of normative isomorphism, and subsequent enforcement 
by major investors and their agents meant isomorphism took on a coercive character. 
Consider the investor outcry when Stuart Rose sought to become executive chairman of 
Marks & Spencer after having been CEO (Burgess, Rigby, & Braithwaite, 2008).  
Another example is the role of non-executive directors. When the Higgs Review (2003) 
recommended at least half of boards should be non-executive directors independent of 
management, that they should have their own leader, and that they should control the main 
board committees, a storm erupted (Nicholson, 2008). This new norm was a violation of 
accepted, institutionalized practice in which the company and specifically its chairman had 
discretion over such matters. Yet the power of the code meant that norm, too, became 
institutionalized.  
A third debate, one that recurred over the two decades of the code but without generating 
quite the same heat, concerned the nature of compliance. That it was not particularly 
    
controversial was because it provided the logic that made the code work for all: the principle 
that complying with the code included non-compliance when accompanied by an 
explanation, or “comply or explain”. It appears to have arisen largely spontaneously from 
within the Cadbury Committee. Through the rest of the consultations over two decades 
dissenting voices argued that “comply or explain” left the code with no teeth, or worse: that 
it had led to a false sense of security that “good” corporate governance was in place. These 
were minority views, however, mainly from actors in more peripheral parts of the landscape. 
In this section we examine the treatment of the concept during the consultations involved in 
each of the three main versions of the code. 
Cadbury 1992 
Early records in the Cadbury Archive give little hint of this elegant solution to the heated 
debate they document between proponents of regulation and those who feared heavy-handed 
regulatory intervention in response to the shocks to the system in the early 1990s. When it 
emerged in the draft code in May 1992, it came with aggressive language that implied 
compliance should be the norm: “to state whether they are complying with the Code and if 
not, why not”. That phrase arose in a paragraph about enforcement through the listing 
regime, which would “require” as a “continuing obligation” a statement of compliance. The 
London Stock Exchange would “draw public attention” to “inadequate disclosure”.  The 
final code softened the language to “or give reasons for non-compliance”, which nonetheless 
left the rhetorical emphasis on compliance. Moreover, the section in which it appeared was 
headed simply “Compliance”. The phrase “comply or explain”, which came to symbolize the 
voluntary nature of the code, did not appear in either the draft or the final document.  
Some respondents to the draft, in particular from the corporate side, praised its 
flexibility, but many argued for more. J.B.H. Jackson, a self-described “professional” 
chairman, welcomed the link to the listing rules an
    
afraid of disclosing non-compliance for good cause” (CAD-02143).  But Stanley Kalms, 
chairman of Dixons whose role at the company in 1992 breached Cadbury’s proposed 
separation of chairman and CEO,3 argued that “non-compliance … should not be outlawed” 
and wanted a “flexible framework”, not a “straight jacket” (CAD-02167). The language 
suggests the strength of his feeling. His metaphor associates the implicit alternative – a 
mandatory code, based in company law – with madness. Cadbury received support as well 
from the investor side for a voluntary approach, now explicitly linked to the alternative of a 
change in law:  
ABI welcomes the emphasis on compliance with a voluntary Code of best 
practice rather than a statutory Code. The former should encourage greater 
consistency with the spirit rather than just the letter; the latter is only likely 
to impose minimum standards. The framework of the Code with 
accompanying recommendations should enable responsible shareholders to 
identify deficiencies more readily and take appropriate action at an early 
stage (ABI, CAD-02467). 
The argument here – that voluntarism will bring compliance with higher standards – 
echoes the self-disciplinary effects of institutions that come to be accepted through 
normative rather than coercive isomorphism, relying upon a common cognitive base and a 
professional network for self-enforcement (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) from among the 
company-investor constituents in field of corporate governance. These actors and others like 
them pushed the committee towards a stance more accommodating of the corporate wish for 
greater board discretion within the new framework. As such their debates can be seen 
simultaneously as seeking to repair the proto-institution of the code while undermining the 
legitimacy of a more extreme interpretation of its meaning.  
2003 Combined Code 
By the time of the first major revision of the code, the phrase “comply or explain” had 
become part of the language of corporate governance around the world. It was used to 
describe the approach used in countries ranging from South Africa to Sweden. In Germany, 
    
the first code of corporate governance incorporated this type of voluntarism despite 
considerable legal and other structural differences between Germany and the UK. Even in 
the US, where the legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley formed the central response to the 
Enron collapse, both Nasdaq (2002) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE, 2003) used 
comply or explain to introduce their new listing recommendation separating the roles of 
chairman and CEO. 
In the consultation in the UK following the Higgs Review, the mechanism of a voluntary 
provision was not widely debated; it was evidently not considered a “fatal flaw” but rather 
one of the strong points of the corporate governance regime. But respondents worried in 
unusually vivid language that market developments had morphed its application in ways 
unanticipated in Cadbury. Viewed from the corporate side, the more prescriptive elements of 
the Higgs draft code, combined with the enforcement through proxy voting advisers, had led 
to a risk of “comply or disdain” (BAT, 05 March 2003) or “comply or else” (CBI, 16 April 
2003). The CBI added in the code it “should be clearly stated that to explain is to comply” 
[emphasis in the original]. Several respondents used terms similar to those of Sir Brian 
Moffat, chairman of the steelmaker Corus writing as senior independent director of HSBC. 
He blamed both the proxy voting firms and the media for the deterioration of meaning in the 
phrase:  
… we have real concern with adopting all the Higgs recommendations as a 
result of experience from the influence of voting recommendations of 
commercial service providers and the attitude of the U.K. media. Their 
recommendations and attitude appear to be based on acceptance of 
“Comply” but rejection of “Explain” - a “box ticking” approach (Corus, 20 
March 2003).  
Moffat then states that the UK “is fortunate to have a HSBC Holdings plc registered 
here”, citing a “real risk” that investors outside the UK might misinterpret UK corporate 
governance, an implicit warning that the bank could move its headquarters abroad if the 
regulatory regime became too uncomfortable. In these examples, the iconic language is used 
    
to undermine how the code had been used in practice, rather than its letter or spirit. In so 
doing, these respondents, arguing from the centre of the landscape, reject the way 
gatekeepers on the periphery had bent the code’s symbolic language to purposes other than 
those of more central actors. Their responses were attempts to return the code to what they 
saw its original purpose, as voluntary guidance, not a performance metric.  
Making this defence of the code simultaneously attacks the extension of it proposed by 
Higgs to include many more provisions, on the grounds it would lead to even more box-
ticking. Lord Weir, chairman of Balfour Beatty, for example, invokes irony to undermine the 
Higgs recommendations by attacking the enforcers. His letter uses the terms “the reality is 
that …” and “the fact is that ...” in the same paragraph, seeking to dismiss the Higgs 
recommendations as being detached from reality and lacking evidence. The depiction of the 
corporate governance staff at investment institutions in that paragraph as “low-level box-
ticking fonctionaires” undermines the legitimacy of investors through a pejorative 
designation of their roles, suggesting the people, not just the approach they take, are “low-
level”. The structure of the phrase invites a reading of “box-ticking” as an attribute of 
individuals, not as a description of an activity they happen to perform. Moreover, selection 
of “fonctionaires” mocks both the old enemy (France) and its new replacement (Brussels, 
that is, the European Union) with just a single word. That sentence goes on, however, to 
voice its strongest rebuke against investors who do not hire their own “fonctionaires” but 
“even” outsource the process to the “unadmirable PIRC”. PIRC, the firm called Pension & 
Investment Research Consultants, was founded in 1986 to advise local authority pension 
funds on their investments. It was often associated with both shareholder activism and left-
wing causes.  
This is language that disdains those who measure compliance and ignore explanations. 
In just four short paragraphs, Lord Weir has used irony to disrupt the attempt to 
    
institutionalize practices he sees as counterproductive (the “unintended consequences” he 
fears). He seeks to support the code, as he and others like him interpret it, while disrupting 
the interpretations of other actors from other parts of the corporate governance landscape.  
2010 UK Corporate Governance Code 
In the consultations in 2009-10, a wider set of voices arose contesting the 
appropriateness of the “comply or explain” provision. Corporate actors in large numbers 
urged a change in language to “apply or explain”. Other respondents, however, remarked 
that the UK response in 2003 to the crisis of Enron and others had been timid in comparison 
to changes introduced in the US under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and urged less 
voluntarism and more compulsion. The CBI’s second submission in 2009 addressed both 
points, while supporting the corporate stance: 
There must be a strong awareness of the need to avoid over-reactions and 
unintended consequences, and we are mindful of the difficulties that arose 
in the US as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley (CBI, October 2009, p. 3). 
The CBI is aware that a number of representations have [been] made that 
the phrase “apply or explain” more accurately reflects the spirit of the 
Combined Code and we would support that view (CBI, October 2009, p. 
8). 
GC100, an association of corporate general counsels, and therefore legal professionals 
with close ties to corporate interests and values, argued the case for “apply-or-explain” even 
more forcefully:  
We are concerned that some investors may choose to simply apply the 
voting recommendations of a proxy agent to their holdings without 
examining the issues themselves (and indeed we recognise that some 
investors feel they are not resourced to undertake comprehensive analysis 
of each company in which they invest during the AGM season, particularly 
smaller firms). Again, this demonstrates why the Code should encourage 
“apply or explain” (rather than comply or explain) as it compels greater 
engagement and dialogue between companies and their owners on the 
governance performance of boards (GC100, October 2009, p. 7). 
    
Moreover it warned against the FRC or the stock market regulators at the Financial 
Services Authority becoming directly involved in enforcement: 
This is why “apply or explain” is a better mantra in this context (and one 
which Derek Higgs himself had wished he had adopted) (GC100, October 
2009, p. 6). 
The various submissions lined up on each side of the debate: Several pointed out that the 
Netherlands corporate governance code had used “apply”, thus invoking a legitimacy 
inherited from a nearby and closely aligned corporate environment and financial market. 
Others noted that South Africa, too, had chosen to use the term “apply”, having been one of 
the first countries to follow the UK down the route of codifying corporate governance and in 
some submission held up as a paragon that had overtaken the UK as a model of best practice.  
The CG100 submission’s reference to Higgs’s comments involved an association with a 
person regarded with considerable reverence by those actors in the field who argue for 
tighter regulation. By invoking the name of the person who had come to symbolize the other 
side of the argument, GC100 undercuts the moral position those actors might make that a 
change in this iconic language would signal a significant softening the code’s stance.  
Contingency, reasonableness and trust 
Across the debate about the substance of the code, corporations seek to maintain the 
discretion associated with a managerialist logic in the face of competing claims, first, of a 
shareholder primacy logic, with roots in market mechanisms, to expand information and 
reduce asymmetries, second, of a professional logic based in normative approaches to 
behaviour, and third, a regulatory logic advanced by what we might call the near-outsiders, 
looking to constrain the discretion of managers, markets and the professions. They make 
competing, substantive arguments over the value of one mechanism versus another based on 
differing claims, resting on different warrants but rooted in the same grounds: recurrent 
corporate failures. In Toulmin’s terms, the mechanisms of governance shaped in the code 
    
involve field-dependent understandings and field-dependent warrants to the competing 
claims, sometimes articulated, sometimes not. 
The process of code-writing, through consultation, drafting and renewed consultation, 
allows the differing warrants to blend. The label of the relevant section of the Cadbury report 
is “Compliance”, placing the weight on one side of the equation. But after the consultation 
the committee then moderates its language from the aggressive “if not, why not” of the draft 
to “give reasons for non-compliance” in the final version. The concept then develops in 
public discourse to an even more evenly weighted “comply or explain”. And in 2010, the 
code reverses the weight by scolding investors and advisers and by giving companies and 
their boards greater leeway: Explanations of non-compliance, it urges “should not be 
evaluated in a mechanistic way and departures from the Code should not be automatically 
treated as breaches” (FRC, 2010, p. 4). The weight of the argument has shifted, in part 
because time has moved on and experience has shown the limitations of codification 
(Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). The arguments over the nature of compliance were rarely 
strident. Almost every actor near the centre of the landscape seemed willing to accept that 
rule-writing would be counter-productive; more at issue was the nature of enforcement. The 
nuances concern the degree of contingency, not the question of whether there was one right 
and rational way forward.  
Participants seemed to accept that the people involved in corporate governance – boards 
and their directors, fund managers, advisers and experts – would not act or be able to act in a 
mechanical way, whatever mechanisms the code specified. They seemed, with a few 
exceptions, to acknowledge that rigid rules and orthodox procedures would not be 
appropriate. On the issue of compliance, the argument concerned a claim that embodied 
contingency, accommodating multiple warrants related to the same grounds. As a result, 
actors from different fields can accept even when they cannot agree on specific measures.  
    
New practices developed after the Cadbury Code, including the “box-ticking” especially 
dreaded by corporations, involved monitoring less by investors than by the governance 
rating firms and proxy voting agencies they employ. Supported by academic studies seeking 
links between firm performance and governance structures, these practices can be seen as 
seeking, in Toulmin’s terms, a rationalist answer, a formula for good governance, at odds 
with the spirit of the code as understood by many corporate actors, investment firms and 
advisers. Those in more peripheral fields argued for even stronger mechanisms to enforce 
compliance, and some for legislation, to reduce the discretion of more powerful actors at the 
centre. Might their longing for rational justifications be an emotional response to their lack 
of power over other actors and events?4 
Following Toulmin’s argument, rationality cannot deal with the uncertainties inherent in 
complex situations. Reasonableness in corporate governance may then involve recognition 
that in the complexity of corporate affairs, circumstances may arise where discretion is 
advisable and others where it is less so. Reasonable people will continue to disagree, but 
reasonableness itself fosters and supports trust.  
Some reasonable inferences 
The present analysis points to a number of reasonable inferences. The attempt to codify 
and institutionalize good corporate governance involves the search for an ideal. The process 
of consultation shows, however, that this ideal is, however, albeit a limited and “political” 
one in the sense the Rawls (2005) has in mind. Having arrived at a reasonable outcome, the 
code grows more articulated and specific over time, approaching something of like the 
comprehensive doctrine that Rawls sees as imperilling liberal institutions. The principle of 
comply-or-explain, however, provides an escape, and one that permits deviation beyond the 
overlapping political consensus in the limited Rawlsian ideal. That is, it accepts, with 
    
reasoned explanations on all matters, embodying the contingency of corporate decision-
making, bringing it more in line with Toulmin’s approach.  
If we accept that Toulmin’s view applies in corporate governance, then attempts to find 
correlations, even causality between variables of governance and performance are likely to 
be frustrated. Such relationships, if they exist, may have some predictive value at the level of 
the portfolio. They may, therefore, be of use to institutional investors, who monitor the 
performance of, say, 2,000 companies to select a portfolio of, say, 500 investments. They are 
much less likely, however, to have predictive value at the level of individual boards and 
appointments of directors, where interpersonal relations and social complexity come into 
play. Worse, using such relationships as targets is likely to have perverse outcomes, through 
managing to targets rather than making reasonable arguments in reasoned debate. If that’s 
the case, then “comply or explain” is a reasonable compromise, giving boards discretion and 
portfolio managers a tool to manage risk.  
Some wider inferences are these: If we accept Toulmin’s view, then macro-level 
associations – while useful for seeing the big picture – are of much less use in prescribing 
micro-level decisions. The rules of the game embodied in field-level institutional 
arrangements may be handy short cuts in boundedly rational contexts, but they are less likely 
to provide guidance in complex or rapidly changing situations, where thoughtfulness is 
needed in application. And in a landscape of overlapping fields and competing institutions, 
openness to narrative and transparency during debate may be a better way to foster trust.  
Reasonableness as accountability 
In conclusion, this discussion suggests a common issue joining the fables of corporate 
ill-doings mentioned at the beginning of this paper and the bad name corporate governance 
has acquired in more mundane practice. Attempts to control through structures, rationally 
devised, limit the freedom of action of those responsible for corporate excess. But they also 
    
threaten the discretion needed for experimentation, innovation and coping with the 
complexities that uncertainty entails. Compliance with institutional norms limits the goal of 
distinctiveness. Yet both have value. Someone with reasonable oversight of the business 
should be able to tell shareholders and others where, when and why discretion is needed, and 
in what ways the standard formula doesn’t fit. That is, directors should be able to provide a 
narrative of what matters and why.  
In explaining his discomfort with the modernist project of Descartes and later 
philosophers, Toulmin (2001, p. 15) writes that the “reasonableness of narratives” came to 
be dismissed as a “soft-centered notion”.  Reasonableness is a middle way between the 
dichotomy of relativism and rationality. He contrasts the “soundness” of substantive 
argumentation – the approach, for example, of the essays of Montaigne, to the “validity” of 
formal arguments, with their reliance on deduction.  
Read as a plea rather than an argument, Toulmin is urging accountability, but not the 
accountability of perfect scores on a questionnaire. This is the type of accountability 
envisaged (if perhaps often abused) in the business judgement rule in Delaware law. This is 
also what Toulmin might term “substantive argumentation” against tyranny of box-ticking 
and against the symbolic management (Bednar, 2012; Westphal & Zajac, 1998) of formal 
compliance instead of considered explanation. This suggests that through the mechanism of 
“comply or explain” the UK code of corporate governance has identified a logic that unites 
most, though not all, the actors in the landscape of corporate governance, providing the 
freedom needed to deal with contingency.  
Reasonably good corporate governance, then, involves the ability to look one’s fellow 
directors in the eye and explain, or demand an explanation of, why this course of action is, 
somehow, best: best, that is, not of necessity, as in a mathematical proof, but, in Toulmin’s 
terms, through substantive argumentation. Reasonably good corporate governance would 
    
involve doing that in public as well, but also without pretending to have the formal proofs. 
This suggests that accountability, at least as envisaged in the UK code, is the ability to give a 
reasonable account, after thoughtful consideration and substantive argumentation, of one’s 
decisions about an uncertain world.  
                                                 
1
 References to Rawls are to the revised versions of his books.  
2
 CAD- numbers refers to the document identification at the Cadbury Archive in the library of the 
Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge. 
3
 Dixons appointed John Clare as group managing director in 1992 and group chief executive in 
1994. Kalms was executive chairman at the time, a title often regarded as involving CEO duality, and 
was deeply involved in the business he had joined, aged 16, in 1948; he had become chairman in 
1971. 
4
 In Cosmopolis, Toulmin (1992) suggests such a basis for Descartes’ adoption of rationalism after 
the chaos of the Thirty-Years’ War.  
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